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Concluding with optimism, Adelheid Wölfl and 
Hansjörg Brey thanked the panellists and 
closed the discussion.
International Workshop at the European Academy in Berlin 
Moldova – Key Challenges and Political Developments
Organizers: Southeast Europe Association (SOG), funded by the German Federal Foreign Office via 
the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
Berlin, 13 / 14 December 2019
Report by Fabian Burkhardt, Berlin
Introduction
This report gives an overview of discussion in 
the realm of the Southeast Europe Association’s 
Workshop on current political developments 
and challenges in Moldova on the 13th and 14th 
December 2019 in Berlin. The workshop gath-
ered 50 politicians and experts from Moldova, 
as well as experts from Germany and other EU 
countries to discuss the key challenges Moldo-
va faced in 2019 and to give an outlook on what 
lies ahead in 2020. 
Besides, taking stock of the country’s turbulent 
political year 2019, the panels addressed more 
specific issues such as reforms, the economy, 
migration, energy as well as foreign policy with 
a specific focus on the two main external actors 
Russia and the EU. Discussions benefited from 
two background papers which have been pub-
lished in the SOG’s online paper series. As the 
workshop took place under the Chatham House 
Rule, discussions are summarized without nam-
ing speakers.
Background
After years of polarization between self-de-
clared ‘pro-Russian’ and ‘pro-EU’ camps, the fo-
cus of Moldovan politics seemed lately to be 
shifting from geopolitics to domestic reforms. 
The parliamentary elections on 24 February 
2019 had split the votes between the Socialist 
Party of President Dodon (31.15 %), the reformist 
and grassroots ACUM platform (26.87 %), and the 
until then ruling Democratic Party (23.62 %), and 
thus gave no single party an outright majority. 
After months of deadlock, in June 2019 the So-
cialists and ACUM surprisingly reached an 
agreement for cooperation, electing Maia Sandu 
as new Prime Minister of the Republic of Mol-
dova. Sandu is a former Minister of Education 
and World Bank adviser. Hopes were high that 
under the new government the country could 
return to the reform path that had been ne-
glected in recent years. However, after the fall 
of the government on 12 November 2019 follow-
ing a no-confidence vote in parliament, the sit-
uation seems once again unclear and snap 
elections likely.
In order to shed light on the recent develop-
ments and a turbulent year in Moldova, the 
workshop aimed to take stock of domestic poli-
tics in 2019 and the prospects for 2020, the 
state of institutional reforms and the country’s 
agenda, Moldova’s economic situation, as well 
as its international politics. In order to under-
stand the latest developments and to draw 
conclusions for the future, also the develop-
ments witnessed during the last decade were 
considered. In 2009, Moldova was already in a 
similar situation, with the change of govern-
ment from the Party of Communists to the ‘Alli-
ance for European Integration’ coalition. Despite 
of high hopes for change, domestic politics 
were soon characterized by an infinite struggle 
for power among domestic elites. When it 
comes to reforms, the formal adoption of poli-
cies to fight corruption, to increase the inde-
pendence of the judiciary, and to strengthen in-
stitutions was rarely followed-up by proper im-
plementation. Thus, the question was what les-
sons should be drawn from past experience 
and for international actors dealing with Mol-
dova.
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Panel 1: Domestic Politics in 2019
The speakers of the panel unanimously agreed 
that for Moldova, 2019 was a year of turbulence. 
The parliamentary elections in February ended 
in a constitutional crisis. The deadlock was ter-
minated in June when a coalition government 
was formed by the Party of Socialists of the Re-
public of Moldova (PSRM, Socialists) and the 
ACUM electoral bloc. But the coalition govern-
ment headed by Prime Minister Maia Sandu 
(ACUM) lasted only until November when it was 
brought down by a parliamentary no-confi-
dence vote and was replaced by a new govern-
ment headed by former Minister of Finance Ion 
Chicu.
The various epithets used to describe these two 
governments are already indicative: While the 
Sandu government was described as an “im-
possible” or “unnatural” coalition, or even an 
“unholy alliance”, the “technocratic” Chicu gov-
ernment which features a significant number of 
former advisers of President Igor Dodon was 
described as a “tacit coalition” between the So-
cialists and the Democratic Party of Moldova 
(PDM, Democrats). While the ouster of the long-
time grey cardinal behind the PDM, Vladimir 
Plahotniuc, was generally seen as a boon for 
the political development of Moldova, concerns 
were raised about the potential emergence of a 
new “strongman” – President Igor Dodon – 
whose major goal is thought to be his reelec-
tion at the upcoming presidential elections 
slated for the end of 2020. Rather than continu-
ing the reform agenda of the previous Sandu 
government, the intention of the Chicu govern-
ment was primarily to support president Dodon 
in achieving electoral victory in the next presi-
dential elections.
Causes for the political turmoil: The main 
thrust of arguments focused on Moldova as a 
captured state with profound problems with 
good governance and the rule of law. As one 
speaker put it: Moldova is not divided by geo-
politics or competing narratives about the past, 
but by kleptocracy. Features of this weak state 
include an oversize role of oligarchs in politics 
and monopolies in the economy, as well as a 
politicized judicial system and civil service.
These general issues with the rule of law have 
significant effects on political campaigns and 
elections. Among electoral malpractice, the 
speakers mentioned the use of administrative 
resources and vote buying. 
Of special concern was the lack of impartiality 
of media as well as fake news and the spread 
of disinformation on social media. Due to polit-
ical connections of media owners, in particular 
TV, national and regional media are used 
against political opponents. While many TV sta-
tions used to be controlled by Vladimir Plahot-
niuc, some speakers wondered how the Social-
ists managed to increase the number of televi-
sion outlets affiliated with their party in a short 
period of time. Another concern was the in-
creasing presence of Russian state television on 
the Moldovan media market. Another feature of 
electoral malpractice is the increasing amount 
of unaccountable money funneled into election 
campaigns. This is both due to loopholes in leg-
islation as well as non-compliance by a wide-
spread disregard of existing legislation.
The emergence of the Sandu coalition govern-
ment and diverging goals within the coalition: 
The main reasons for the creation of the “un-
natural” or “impossible” coalition between the 
previously opposed political forces PSRM and 
ACUM was the common goal to get rid of 
Vladimir Plahotniuc. The parties shared the in-
terest of dismantling elements of the previous 
regime, namely the strong control over political 
institutions and monopolies over the economy. 
A symbol of the pledge to work together was 
the Temporary Provisional Agreement that was 
signed by the parties. In the initial stage, a few 
common objectives could be identified: First, in 
the short-term to conduct a justice reform and 
the depoliticization of state institutions. Sec-
ond, to organize snap elections freely, based on 
the new proportional electoral system. And 
third, there was to be a division of labor in ex-
ternal policy: The Sandu government and ACUM 
were committed to restore good relations with 
the EU while Igor Dodon and the Socialists were 
to restore good relations with Russia. 
The overall performance of the Sandu govern-
ment was aptly summarized in the phrase: “one 
government, two parallel agendas.” The most 
frequent metaphor most speakers appeared to 
agree with was: “ACUM danced ballet while the 
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Socialists were boxing.” The hardly hidden aim 
of this “boxing” approach of the Socialists was 
to take up as many key positions in the “force 
institutions” and the judiciary as possible. 
Meanwhile, the Sandu government was “danc-
ing ballet” and pursuing its overarching goal to 
conduct uncompromising reforms. The key pil-
lars of ACUM’s reform agenda can be subsumed 
under four “Ds”: deoligarchization, democratiza-
tion, demonopolization of the economy, and 
depoliticization of institutions with a distinct 
focus on justice reform. 
One panelist described deoligarchization as dif-
ficult to embrace in legal terms, but with two 
distinct components: First, unilateral power of 
an individual, or a group of persons over the in-
stitutions of state law enforcement bodies 
should be limited. And second, there should be 
clear limits for financing political parties and 
media from offshore organizations. Different 
understandings of deoligarchization not only 
created rifts between the two coalition part-
ners, but even within ACUM, as some ACUM bloc 
members did not want to follow through on a 
draft bill on deoffshorization. Beyond differenc-
es in interpretation, deoligarchization created 
another dilemma between speed and legality. If 
the reforms were to have any lasting effect at 
all, they would have to be implemented swiftly. 
But the coalition was bound by law when it 
comes to changing the heads of many institu-
tions. Some were virtually irremovable, like the 
heads of regulatory agencies. 
This dilemma created incentives to accumulate 
sweeping powers, even for a benign purpose of 
conducting reforms. President Dodon and the 
Socialists were described by speakers as unin-
terested in reforms. Their main goal was to 
amass power over state institutions and pack 
organizations with loyal officials. Early on in the 
coalition, president Dodon received more com-
petences over the intelligence services and the 
Security Council. In contrast to the govern-
ment’s reform agenda, the Socialists were de-
scribed by speakers as politicizing the process 
of appointments and circumventing contests 
when appointing heads of the customs office, 
tax office, and board members of state compa-
nies. In terms of foreign relations, there was 
some sort of division of labor: While the Sandu 
government was committed to restore good re-
lations with the EU, Dodon and the Socialists 
intended to restore good relations with Russia. 
While some palpable reform progress helped to 
unlock money from the IMF, EU, and the EBRD, 
the early collapse of the coalition prompted the 
speakers to search for reasons. They identified 
two proximate stumbling blocks that triggered 
the end of the coalition in November. The first 
was the issue of the general prosecutor. While 
ACUM pressed for the selection of an entirely 
independent official, such a choice beyond the 
control of political forces was argued to be too 
much of a danger for president Dodon and the 
Socialists, hence their fierce resistance. The 
second proximate reasons were the local elec-
tions on November 4 which resulted in a back-
lash for ACUM. Especially in the capital city 
Chișinău, where the Socialist Ion Ceban defeat-
ed Andrei Nastase of the ACUM bloc.
The Chicu government: Loyal to president Do-
don with low prospects for conducting reforms. 
Despite rhetorical commitment by the new 
Chicu government to continue the reform agen-
da of the previous government, both the com-
position of the government consisting mainly of 
Dodon confidants while being formally 
non-partisan, technocratic, as well as concrete 
actions appear to demonstrate that there was 
little hope for reforms. Some speakers even at-
tested a “reoligarchization” of politics since 
Moldova wound up with a new “strongman” 
who runs the state like a “limited company”. 
Since the reelection of Igor Dodon at the 2020 
presidential elections was the undeclared main 
goal of the government, participants expect a 
rise in “social populism” by increasing the 
spending on social policy to win over the hearts 
and minds of the population. 
Depending on the degree of this social spend-
ing, the effect on the state budget and there-
fore on the relationship with the IMF and the 
EU might be “disastrous” for what was begun by 
the previous government. With regard to foreign 
policy, a balanced approach between Russia 
and the EU was expected. In practice, this might 
turn into a “game of smoke and mirrors” to play 
one side against the other in order to receive as 
much foreign aid from both external actors on 
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beneficial terms for Moldova with as little con-
ditionality attached as possible. Moreover, the 
government is actively looking for new donors 
with China and Turkey as likely candidates for 
investments.
Forecast 2020: There was a shared expectation 
that 2020 is likely to remain as “hot” and “tur-
bulent” as 2019 because of the focal point of 
the presidential elections expected to be held 
by the end of 2020 (between October and De-
cember). There were little doubts that president 
Dodon was willing to use all means available to 
seek reelection. But no agreement could be 
reached on what exact strategy would be pur-
sued to achieve reelection. If at all, political ac-
tion or even a political crisis should be expect-
ed in spring (between March and June) 2020. 
Mainly because time is needed after the winter 
break, but also due to provisions in the Consti-
tution: According to Article 85.4, the parliament 
cannot be disbanded later than six months be-
fore the end of the term of the president. The 
presidential mandate ends in December 2020. 
In order to hold elections simultaneously, one 
would need to disband the parliament in mid-
June. 
Most speakers agreed that snap elections were 
generally possible, but not very likely at this 
point. A look at the political history of Moldova 
shows that snap elections occur rarely (1994, 
1999, and 2010). Beside the constitution, snap 
elections would depend on Dodon’s and the 
Socialists’ electoral rating, on the government’s 
support by the Democrats in the parliament, 
but also on the performance of the ACUM bloc 
and their internal stability to create a counter-
weight to the ruling coalition. With regard to the 
electoral rules, some even assumed that presi-
dent Dodon might go as far as to initiate a con-
stitutional amendment to return to an indirect 
election of the president by the parliament in-
stead of a direct vote by the population. Russia 
might also be interested in snap elections to 
create a more solid pro-Russian majority of 
leftist forces to bolster their agenda in Transn-
istria. Generally, the expectation prevailed that 
the real level of influence and activity from 
Moscow will become even higher, while patriot-
ic slogans might play a prominent role during 
the electoral campaign in the debate on how 
Transnistria can be reintegrated into Moldova, 
potentially by creating a special status.
Panel 2: Moldova’s Reform Agenda
The general context of reforms is a democratic 
backlash. The backsliding is reflected in inter-
national rankings in which Moldova today does 
worse than in previous years. In Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, 
Moldova ranks 120th out of 180 countries while 
five years ago it was ranked 102. In the Rule of 
Law Index of the World Justice Project, Moldova 
ranks 83rd out of 126, in the Criminal Justice 
subindex it is on rank 97 out of 126 countries. As 
one panelist framed it, Moldova “hit the jack-
pot” when it comes to challenges governments 
face. There are four such simultaneous struc-
tural challenges that have been inhibiting Mol-
dova’s development: First, an identity crisis di-
vides the country between the two concepts of 
an ethnic and a civic nation. Hence any 
state-building and reform effort would need to 
be preceeded by nation-building. Second, due 
to geopolitical cleavages Moldova often was a 
playground due to geographic constraints. Par-
ticularly the Russian influence was not condu-
cive to meaningful reforms. Third, emigration 
contributes to decreasing human capital which 
creates a huge pressure on the public sector 
since the brightest people tend to prefer the 
private sector due to more competitive salaries. 
Fourth, endemic corruption and clientelism 
function as a sort of replacement for the lack-
ing welfare state, and political institutions are 
mainly used for rent-seeking.
One other panelist enumerated four additional, 
political factors that generally impede any re-
formist endeavor: The first necessary condition 
is strong parliamentary support, but often there 
is no clear coalition. Second, a long-term per-
spective of at least four years is crucial but 
rarely achieved due to frequent government 
turnovers. Third, reforms are regularly done in a 
quick way without evidence by data and expert 
analysis. Fourth, alternative resources for moni-
toring the results of reform agendas besides 
those provided by the government are mostly 
absent. 
Particularly the overarching issue of time hori-
zons was highlighted by speakers across policy 
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fields: The most pressing problems such as mi-
gration would require long-term strategies 
across party lines, but short-termism and an 
absence of a vision for the future were typical 
characteristics of many policy domains. Moldo-
va thus oscillates between two equilibria that 
both provide negative incentives for reforms: 
Short-term governments that tend to engage in 
irresponsible policies due to electoral concerns, 
and political forces that attempt to establish 
wholesale control over politics and the econo-
my by means of authoritarian and oligarchic 
practices. Currently, according to several speak-
ers, Moldova faces the danger of the “installa-
tion of a new authoritarian regime” that would 
not only do away with the feeble democratic 
pluralism achieved in 2019, but would also di-
minish the chances of thorough reforms.
Public administration: A reform of the public 
administration system is widely seen as the 
cornerstone and basic requirement of any fu-
ture progress of Moldova since no economic 
progress can be achieved without sweeping 
change. Moldova’s system of public administra-
tion was characterized as dysfunctional and not 
accountable. One crucial aspect is its size which 
makes the bureaucracy both costly and ineffi-
cient. The example of local public administra-
tion and territorial reform demonstrates that 
any endeavor of cutting the civil service for rea-
sons of efficiency would prove to be politically 
costly. As a priority, speakers identified the jus-
tice system, particularly the prosecutor general, 
courts, and customs. One point of critique was 
that the current Government Program does not 
say much about the strategic priorities of Mol-
dova in the realm of public administration re-
form. It does have a lot of actions such as the 
aim to create a modern public procurement 
system in line with EU standards, a task that 
needs to be accomplished by December 2020.
Judiciary: The reform of the justice system is 
crucial for at least two reasons. First, it was one 
of the main priorities of the Sandu government 
and a major bone of contention within the coa-
lition. And second, support by external donors 
is tied to reform progress in the justice sector, 
among others. The Prosecutor General’s Office 
was described as more powerful than the Presi-
dent due to the Soviet heritage. By taking calls 
from politicians and extracting rents from over-
seeing businesses, the Prosecutor General 
wields enormous power over the system. But 
since the use of the Prosecutor General is a po-
tent weapon of those wielding power against 
political opponents, the incentives to turn the 
office into an institution serving public interest 
are believed to be low. Regarding the Constitu-
tional Court, the members of which had re-
signed during the 2019 constitutional crises, 
one panelist argued that the contest of ap-
pointing new judges had been flawed. One pan-
elist stated “a complete shift of philosophy” 
with the justice reform of the Chicu govern-
ment. Instead of an external evaluation of judg-
es and prosecutors, there would be an internal 
evaluation process. In other words, corrupt 
judges will evaluate fellow corrupt judges.
Migration: The core thesis of one panelist on 
emigration was that it is one of the key chal-
lenges Moldova faces. This is because it leaves 
a deep imprint on other spheres such as the la-
bor market, education and health. The numbers 
provided speak a clear language: In the last five 
years, the number of students in schools has 
decreased by five percent from 350,000 pupils 
to 344,000 pupils. The number of schools was 
reduced from 1,370 to 1,240. At universities, in 
the last six years the number of students has 
decreased by 37 percent. The number of teach-
ers in primary and secondary schools shrank by 
more than ten percent in the last five years 
from 30,000 to 27,000. And the number of doc-
tors per 1,000 residents is twice lower in Mol-
dova than the average of EU. 
This trend poses at least two serious challeng-
es: First, any policy targeted only at migration 
would fail to address the entire phenomenon. 
Second, migration is such a complex issue that 
urgent measures would need to be taken in the 
next 5 – 7 years across party lines. The flow of 
remittances has dropped by 8.5 percent in the 
last years from 24 percent to 16 percent as 
share of the Moldovan GDP. The visa free regime 
with the EU was described as “one of the main 
achievements of the Eastern Partnership” as 
more than 2.1 million Moldovans have already 
benefited from it. Nonetheless, there is evi-
dence that an increasing number of Moldovans 
goes to the EU with biometric passports to seek 
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work even though this is illegal, or to seek asy-
lum with the help of organized criminal net-
works. 
Foreign policy and foreign trade: In the realm 
of foreign policy, the main question was what 
kind of repercussions a potential free trade 
agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union 
would have on Moldova. Even though the So-
cialists speak publicly about a balanced foreign 
policy with regard to European and Eurasian in-
tegration, one panelist argued that the concept 
of balanced foreign policy always “was a euphe-
mism for turning to the east”, and that the “bal-
anced foreign policy is now rather unbalanced”. 
One concern was that increased economic and 
financial ties to Russia might create additional 
liabilities.
Role of the civil society in reforms: At an ab-
stract level, one panelist saw the potential con-
tribution of civil society to reforms, first, in 
monitoring activities and writing reports for 
transparency reasons. And second in supporting 
reforms with expertise and analyses. There was 
agreement among the speakers that the Chicu 
government showed little effort to engage with 
civil society.
Role of the EU: The EU was portrayed as being 
conducive to reforms mainly through the in-
strument of conditionality. The Moldovan gov-
ernment was arguably engaged in reforms once 
it was “forced” to do so by international agree-
ments it signed. The Association Agreement and 
particularly the visa-free regime were charac-
terized as the main motivation for reforms in 
Moldova. This inevitably creates a reform co-
nundrum: At the moment, there was no other 
comparable “carrot” that would work as an 
equal motivation to implement reforms. Simple 
budget support was deemed an insufficient in-
centive. The main challenge for the Eastern 
Partnership and Association Agreement agenda 
would therefore be to come up with new incen-
tives to motivate the Moldovan government and 
citizens equally. Georgia and Ukraine are gener-
ally considered to be positive examples to be 
emulated by Moldova. 
Panel 3: Economy, Migration, and  
Energy Supply
The third panel was dedicated to three consid-
erably diverse policy domains. But one charac-
teristic that unites these is the challenge of 
limited resources that Moldova faces. As one 
panelist quipped, Moldova is often said to be 
an emerging country or economy, but it is diffi-
cult to actually find something emerging there. 
Economy: Despite its limited resources and 
many dependencies, Moldova can also boast a 
number of success stories. One of these are the 
introduction of Free Entrepreneurial Zones. 
They helped to create jobs and helped to kick-
start the automotive industry in Moldova which 
now has around 70,000 employees with Ger-
man, Japanese, and American producers. One 
problem that frequently occurs is a lack of co-
ordination and long-term planning when mutu-
ally exclusive industries are settled on adjacent 
territories. Another success is an IT park which 
provides software companies with the opportu-
nity to register as virtual residents and pay only 
seven percent from sales with no other taxes 
and payments. As thousands of software com-
panies registered, the ICT industry in Moldova 
has demonstrated good growth. According to 
one speaker, the downside has been so far that 
mainly IT services companies preferred to regis-
ter under this special fiscal regime, but only few 
proper software companies. 
The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) with the EU was unanimously lauded as 
Moldova’s biggest success story. The impact on 
the country was much larger than on the other 
Eastern Partnership countries Ukraine and 
Georgia with which the EU concluded an analo-
gous agreement. According to a comparative 
study by Berlin Economics, there was a 60 per-
cent increase in the export of goods from Mol-
dova to the EU from USD one billion in 2013 to 
1.6 billion in 2018. Excluding the price effect 
with constant prices, the effect increases to 73 
percent. The share of the EU in Moldovan ex-
ports increased from 56 percent in 2013 to 74 
percent in 2018. 
In terms of the commodity composition, the 
DCFTA did not have a strong effect. In other 
words, Moldova still exports more of the same. 
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FDI increased from USD 2.1 billion in 2013 to 2.5 
billion in 2018. But as the FDI from other coun-
tries also increased, the share did not change 
much. The reason why the DCFTA failed to have 
a significant effect on FDI is that business cli-
mate is much more important for FDI than for 
trade. Since 3/4 of Moldovan exports now go to 
the EU, the panelist concluded that it would not 
be wise for any Moldovan government to ques-
tion the DCFTA. This development is even more 
striking if one considers that still in 2011, 
around 2/3 of exported goods went to Russia. 
As another panelist remarked, this turnaround 
was not so much about switching from one 
market to another, but about changing mentali-
ty and profile of Moldovan producers. Since the 
EU was understood to be about clear rules and 
regulations, Moldovan producers became used 
to norm and regulatory compliance such as 
product safety standards. But the DCFTA raised 
a few questions that would need to be tackled 
by policy makers: First, tariff-rate quotas for ba-
sic agricultural products are used up very 
quickly, therefore they should be increased. 
Second, in the view of one speaker, Transnistria 
also enjoys a lot of benefits from the DCFTA and 
the Association Agreement (AA) – by exporting 
steel, caviar, or textile – without contributing to 
the Moldovan budget which de facto amounts 
to a discrimination of local Moldovan produc-
ers. 
Another Transnistria-related issue is the ques-
tion of border control: While Moldova erected a 
system of laboratories and inspection points to 
comply with EU food safety regulations, the (in-
ternal) border with Transnistria is porous, and 
illicit imports (for example of meat from Odes-
sa, Ukraine) poses risks for food security. Third, 
concerns were raised that companies unequally 
benefit from the DCFTA, particularly to the ad-
vantage of big companies and monopolists, and 
the disadvantage of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME). This question is not easy to 
assess due to the lack of statistical data on 
companies, here Moldovan authorities should 
improve the quality of data collection. Fourth, a 
related critique stated was that the structure of 
products still was reliant on traditional prod-
ucts with low added value. In general, the 
transparent and predictable rules and regula-
tions of the DCFTA with the EU were positively 
contrasted with the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (CIS) Free Trade Area since the 
latter includes lists of agreed exporters which 
are risky in terms of corruption since compa-
nies often are at the mercy of bureaucrats to be 
on that list. 
During the panel, the speakers identified a 
number of key challenges that inhibit Moldova’s 
economic development. First, businesses face 
huge problems in finding qualified labor force 
due to a massive lack in human capital. Among 
others, this is due to the fact that Moldovan cit-
izens demonstrate a high labor mobility while 
the Moldovan state lacks behind in integrating 
itself into the global economy. A second major 
hindrance is the business environment, and 
namely the over-regulation of the economy. 
Moldova considerably lags in international 
comparison. Even though Moldova is ranked 
48th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
ranking, in the indicator of construction per-
mits, Moldova is ranked 156th.
Migration: Migration was described as 
“cross-cutting issue with many angles” ranging 
from the economy to demography and security, 
due to an enormous outflow of about one mil-
lion Moldovans since 1991. In 2018, there was a 
negative migration balance of 48,600 (more 
leaving than coming back). By the year 2050, 
the population is projected to decrease by 20 
percent. With regard to the countries of desti-
nation, there is an approximate split of 50 to 50 
percent between Russia and the EU (mainly Po-
land and Italy). Ukraine, the US and Israel are 
also important destinations. According to sur-
veys, more than 40 percent of the diaspora are 
highly educated and therefore constitute a sig-
nificant brain drain for the country. 
Remittances received as percent of GDP peaked 
in 2006 according to World Bank figures, since 
then there has been a steady decrease. For the 
economy this might be interpreted as a positive 
sign since “reliance on remittances is a fool’s 
errand”, according to the panelist. In Moldova, 
household consumption accounts for over 80 
percent of GDP, a very high figure in interna-
tional comparison. Part of this consumption 
stems from remittances. This means that there 
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is a smaller margin for the GDP containing in-
vestment into the economy. The high rate of re-
mittances is ultimately a dependency, it lowers 
the possibilities for a diversification of the 
economy, and ultimately leads to a lower 
standard of living. 
This outward migration trend leaves a deep im-
print on Moldova’s demography: There are rela-
tively more elderly people, and working age 
groups are shrinking fast (by 10 to 15 %). One 
solution, according to one speaker might be the 
creation of centers for the retraining of the la-
bor force. The negative migration trends are re-
flected in international rankings: In the Human 
Capital Index of the World Bank, Moldova is in 
the same league as Albania and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The World Economic Forum Com-
petitiveness Index demonstrates that Moldova 
has very low scores on talent retention. To tack-
le these issues, the Moldovan government 
drafted a Diaspora plan 2025, convened a com-
mittee on diaspora, and operates a bureau for 
relations with the diaspora. 
Promising actions that could be taken are 
schemes like 1+1, a financing facility that match-
es funds coming from the diaspora into SMEs 
and rural development, and the support of lo-
cal credit unions and therefore being able to 
profit from financial services. And agreements 
could be concluded on social rights so that 
people from the diaspora can actually come 
home and reap the benefits of work in terms of 
pensions. One possibility for the EU would be 
to ponder investments in “Partnerships for 
Skills” programs, for instance in the education 
system of Moldova, as many EU countries which 
are on the receiving end profit tremendously 
from migrant labor. Even though there is a man-
ifest “migration crisis” in Moldova, relatively lit-
tle has been done by the EU to mitigate the 
outflow.
Energy: Moldova’s dependencies in the sphere 
of energy are as much an issue of energy secu-
rity as they are of economic development. In 
terms of energy, Moldova is entirely dependent 
on Russia. This is not only the case for gas, but 
also for electricity which is bought from a Rus-
sian power plant in Transnistria. According to 
the panelist, Moldova’s priority should be to 
build a gas pipeline from Romania to Moldova 
to decrease its dependence from Russia. Sever-
al other avenues are also promising for diversi-
fication: These are Black Sea shelf gas, reverse 
flows from Slovakia, and renewable energy 
(Moldova committed itself to the EU to have 20 
percent of renewables in its energy mix by 
2025). Moldova also has commitments to imple-
ment the Third Energy Package in order to un-
bundle the national gas monopolists. One 
speaker argued that the Socialists were unlikely 
to follow through to reduce these vulnerabili-
ties since this would go against the interests of 
the Kremlin. Another speaker pointed out that 
Moldova did little to liberalize the energy mar-
ket during its presidency of the Energy Commu-
nity. 
Panel 4: Moldova Between Russia and the EU
The idea that Moldova is a country that oscil-
lates between East and West is well-estab-
lished. Therefore, the short-lived Sandu govern-
ment was not just an exceptional case in recent 
Moldovan history, but for the Eastern partner-
ship countries, if not for the whole post-Soviet 
space as a whole. Due to a rare “coincidence of 
interests”, the EU and Russia pulled the same 
strings for a short period of time. As one pan-
elist put it, “geopolitics temporarily disap-
peared”. The Sandu government was seen as a 
crucial test case by some whether Russia could 
potentially be seen as reliable partner in the 
post-Soviet space. One of the main concerns of 
the Chicu government appeared to be that Mol-
dova is still an object in the hands of the big-
gest players on the international scene rather 
than a subject with own agency in international 
relations. 
Metaphors used to describe Moldova’s role re-
volved around the images of a “bridge” con-
necting East and West in a neutral way, and “ex-
clusive love” demanded either by Russia or the 
EU that would exclude a mutually beneficial re-
lationship. Russia currently appears to allow 
Moldova to flirt with the EU, but since it is heav-
ily invested in President Dodon, this tolerant 
stance might abruptly end after the 2020 presi-
dential elections, and they might try to push for 
a quick solution of the Transnistria issue on 
Russian terms by pulling off a “Kozak memo-
randum 2.0”. Such an advance would have a 
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significant impact ranging from the “Macron ini-
tiative” to the Minsk agreements on Ukraine. 
Moldova-EU: A structural change in the rela-
tions to the EU without a fully-fledged Europe-
anization. In the longer term, the relations of 
Moldova with the European Union have under-
gone a qualitative, structural change. For in-
stance, trade has seen a complete reversal in 
the last decades. While in 1997, exports to the 
CIS accounted for 69 percent (about 50 % to 
Russia), in 2018 Moldovan exports to Russia ac-
counted for a mere 15 percent of Moldovan ex-
ports while 69 percent went to the EU. Moreo-
ver, the EU gave around €1.3 billion in grants 
and other financial support, and the EIB provid-
ed €175 million in preferential credits. But there 
is more to this structural change than trade and 
financial support: Since October 2005, the EU 
operates a delegation in Chișinău, the time it 
joined the mediation process of the Transnistria 
conflict as an observer in the 5+2 format. With 
the accession of Romania, Moldova became a 
direct neighbor to the EU in 2007. 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the ensuing 
war in Donbas also had a profound impact on 
Moldova since its Eastern neighbor Ukraine cut 
many ties with Russia and reoriented itself to-
wards the EU. Most importantly, there are the 
AA, the DCFTA, the visa liberalization, and signif-
icant cross-border cooperation. In Moldova it-
self, a new post-Soviet generation of politicians 
emerged that was educated in Moldova and 
many of which went for degrees to Romania. 
Due to this non-Soviet socialization, the nation-
al elite is much less Russia-centric than before. 
Despite this trend, the palpable structural 
change has not led to a fully-fledged European-
ization, or “Westernization”, of Moldovan poli-
tics and, as one panelist put it, “rupture with 
the Russian world”. 
Among the many reasons that slow down the 
process of Europeanization were: 1) The loss of 
human capital due to emigration 2) the divide 
between cities and rural areas contributing to a 
“cultural and intellectual isolation” of rural 
Moldova 3) a low penetration of “Western lan-
guages” as compared to the Baltics and Georgia 
4) a nostalgia for Soviet stability: More than 65 
percent of Moldovans aged over 50 regret the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. This nostalgia 
is related that the EU bears responsibility for 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and that it is 
because of the EU that Moldovan exporters 
cannot export to Russia and blame the EU for 
the DCFTA, and not Russia for retaliating against 
it. 5) Russian propaganda which amplifies the 
successes of Russia and the failures of the EU 
6) corruption and rent-seeking behavior among 
those who rhetorically pretend to be pro-Euro-
pean.
Foreign policy orientation of President Dodon 
and the Chicu government: “A European Moldo-
va with Russia?” The Sandu government was a 
unique case since it was the “most representa-
tive coalition” in Moldova’s post-Soviet history 
as it did not pit “pro-European” against 
“pro-Russian” forces, as in previous electoral 
cycles. Yet with the collapse of the Sandu gov-
ernment, this short-lived “success story” also 
ended abruptly. As in previous panels in which 
the Chicu government’s foreign policy was de-
scribed as an attempt to balance Russia and 
the EU in order “to get the best out of the two 
worlds”, one speaker characterized the ap-
proach with the slogan “Let’s build a European 
Moldova together with Putin”, a revival of a 
campaign slogan that won the Communist lead-
er Vladimir Voronin 66 seats in the 2009 parlia-
mentary elections. The ideal type thinking be-
hind this approach was to seek closer coopera-
tion with and additional loans from both Russia 
and the EU without alienating either one of 
them. 
The speakers debated potentially hidden inten-
tions, practical implications and possible con-
tradictions of this approach. First, several 
speakers questioned the actual intention and 
pointed to its evolution over time. One panelist 
warned that “everything is a game and is not 
what it looks like”. “Geopolitics,” the speaker 
continued, “is always about money. About 
someone else’s money.” Being “pro-Russian”, or 
“pro-European” was just another rent-seeking 
strategy to extract favorable loans from abroad. 
Second, it was president Dodon who was pull-
ing the strings in terms of foreign policy. In the 
description of one panelist, Dodon “proved to 
be a very shrewd, cunning and efficient political 
operator in Moldovan realities”. In this respect, 
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it is crucial to track the evolution of Dodon’s 
rhetoric on foreign policy. On the AA with the 
EU, Dodon’s rhetoric has changed from sup-
porting his party’s decision to cancel the AA in 
early 2017, to renegotiating the AA, and finally in 
mid-2018 to continue the implementation of 
the AA. A similar switch occurred with regard to 
publicly stating that the NATO office in Moldova 
should be closed down, to remaining silent 
about it. Finally, Dodon publicly explained his 
earlier statement about “Russian Crimea” that 
it actually meant “Crimea de facto belongs to 
Russia, and de jure to Ukraine”.
Russian policy on Moldova between punitive 
measures and a loan: According to one pan-
elist, Russia has made it repeatedly clear that it 
considers the post-Soviet space a zone of its 
privileged interest. Frozen conflicts (read: Trans-
nistria) remain an effective tool in inhibiting 
the drift of the former Soviet Republics to the 
West. From this point of view, Russia’s goal was 
achieved in Moldova. There are no troops on 
Moldovan territory other than Russian troops, 
which, according to the official reading of the 
Moldovan government, are deployed, and am-
munition is stockpiled, illegally in Transnistria. 
In the words of one speaker, Russia also “weap-
onized trade” against Moldova by enacting four 
successive embargo waves in 2006, 2010, 2013, 
and 2014. There was little doubt that Moscow 
used these economic sanctions to gain political 
leverage over Moldova and retaliate for closer 
relations with the EU. Evidently, Russia’s calcu-
lation is that the costs of reversing Moldova’s 
trade balance from being Russia-centric to 
EU-centric are less than the gain from prevent-
ing Moldova from a closer political, and eventu-
ally, security-related integration with the EU 
and NATO. 
Another instrument in the Russian toolbox of 
retaining influence over Moldova is a loan the 
size and the conditions of which remain unclear 
to date. Shortly after the new PM Chicu came 
into office in November 2019, he traveled to 
Moscow and announced a potential USD 500 
million loan slated for investment projects. 
Chicu explicitly linked it to unacceptable condi-
tions imposed by the IMF. The current three-
year IMF program expires in March 2020, and 
the Chicu government has made it clear that it 
was willing to negotiate the next memorandum 
much tougher than the Filip government. One 
speaker voiced concerns that the announce-
ment of this potential loan – at this point it is 
unclear whether Moscow will actually follow 
through – was made bypassing the public and 
competent political institutions while the con-
ditions still remain in the dark: “When you bor-
row from authoritarians, there are always 
strings attached.” But as one panelist explained, 
Moldova finds itself “at the crossroads”: To 
boost economic development with investments 
in infrastructure and the energy sector, it was 
indispensable to find USD one to 1.5 billion in 
the next two or three years rapidly, and cheaper 
– implying also with less conditionality – than 
on the international financial markets. 
Eurasian integration and the EU: Moldova’s ob-
server status in the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) raised many questions since there are 
apparently some more procedures to be com-
pleted to formalize the status. The main criti-
cism raised was that neither the Filip nor the 
Sandu governments, and the parliament, nei-
ther saw nor ratified a document on this status. 
The observer status was understood to be a pet 
project of president Dodon. But the main inter-
est of Moldova, as one speaker noted, was to be 
informed and follow the developments within 
the EAEU, without commitments and further en-
gagement. Moldova continues to be a ful-
ly-fledged member of the CIS community, main-
ly through the CIS Free Trade Area (CISFTA). The 
aim of this membership in the CIS community 
was mainly economic, and only partly about 
political cooperation, and not at all about mili-
tary cooperation. 
With regard to a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
with the EAEU, the Chicu government believes 
that this was in the interest of Moldova, just as 
any other FTA negotiated with around forty oth-
er countries such as China or Turkey. But at this 
point, such an FTA with the EAEU remains “in 
theoretical distance” as even consultations with 
the secretary of the Union on a start of negotia-
tions have not begun. Since the PRSM’s elector-
al party program envisioned a dismantling of 
the AA and DCFTA, and a full membership with 
the EAEU, it is no wonder that Dodon’s flirta-
tions with Moscow raised many eyebrows, par-
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ticularly also because Moscow insisted on an 
either/or logic with regard to the EAEU and the 
EU. Nonetheless, the implementation of the AA 
remains of the highest priority for the Chicu 
government, as well as the commitment to use 
the DCFTA to its full advantage as it is seen as 
an important tool to overcome the blockade on 
the Eastern flank. In the view of president Do-
don, a potential renegotiation does not mean 
to scrap the whole agreement, but to tackle a 
“couple of articles” to achieve further protec-
tion of Moldovan producers, mainly in agricul-
ture and animal breeding.
The future of reintegration of Transnistria and 
the status of Moldova’s neutrality: The speak-
ers generally complained that there was neither 
a vision nor a discussion by the political camps 
and a widespread disinterest on the side of the 
population with regard to the reintegration of 
Transnistria. Dodon’s presidential administra-
tion drew up a so-called “Big Package” – a doc-
ument that is supposed to propose a start of a 
dialogue on this delicate issue. The “ideology” 
of the Big Package can be summarized in three 
points: First, in the view of the drafters, the set-
tlement is neither an issue of the EU, Russia, 
nor the US. Moldova itself should first draft a 
vision, find a national consensus, and then 
present it to the big international players. 
Moreover, no time must be lost, the process 
should be started “soon”. 
Second, Moldova is portrayed as having the 
choice between exactly two options only: 1) Ei-
ther Moldova will pay the price of becoming an 
internationally recognized neutral country as a 
necessary precondition for the withdrawal of 
Russian troops. 2) Or Russian troops will remain 
forever in the best scenario. In the worst sce-
nario, Moldova would face a secessionist war 
like Georgia did with South Ossetia and Abkhaz-
ia, and Ukraine with Crimea and Donbas. In oth-
er words, reintegration will need to be bought 
with an internationally recognized neutral sta-
tus equaling a rejection of EU and NATO mem-
bership. Third, the drafters see the Package ex-
plicitly as a potential model solution for 
Ukraine. Any movement towards the realization 
of the Big Package could have wide-ranging im-
plications for the Minsk Agreements, too.
Neutrality of Moldova, its meaning and implica-
tions were heavily debated among the speakers. 
Since neutrality was a “fetish” for president Do-
don, the question arose whether he was intrin-
sically motivated or whether neutrality – which 
de facto limits Moldova’s sovereignty – was im-
posed. Russia on its part made it clear to Mol-
dova that a withdrawal of troops and ammuni-
tion could only take place if Russia was sure no 
one else moved in instead. That is, Russia 
framed its position in the words of an ultima-
tum. But even if Moldova achieved this interna-
tionally recognized neutral status, serious 
doubts would remain about Russia’s commit-
ment to such a document. 
The main argument was that Russia did not ful-
fill its obligations to withdraw its troops from 
Moldovan and Georgian territories as decided 
upon on the 1999 Istanbul OSCE summit, and 
that Russia violated Ukraine’s territorial sover-
eignty by annexing Crimea and waging war in 
Donbas despite international guarantees in the 
Budapest Memorandum. Some speakers also 
suspected that neither the EU nor the US would 
agree to such a deal of neutrality, mostly be-
cause this would limit Moldova’s state sover-
eignty considerably, and because this would 
smack of a division of the European continent 
in spheres of influence. But even if the big in-
ternational players agreed, this would be detri-
mental to Moldovan national interests by turn-
ing Moldova into a “grey zone” and an “in-be-
tween-state”.
Panel 5: The Way Ahead – Outlook to 2020
In terms of the regime quality of Moldova’s po-
litical system, there was a broad agreement 
about a trend towards limited pluralism and 
authoritarianism as president Dodon and the 
Socialist party strive to gain control over insti-
tutions. But even though it is obvious that Do-
don has been creating a power vertical, it re-
mains to be seen in how far he is willing to use 
the powers he amassed, and how far he will be 
able to use them. So far, he has not faced too 
much political pressure yet. Moreover, one pan-
elist even assumed that authoritarian tenden-
cies might fade in 2020 as pluralism remains 
solid, and the urge to proceed with deoligarchi-
zation is strong among many political forces. 
Dodon also appears to be interested in attract-
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ing voters from the political center. Among oth-
ers, this also depends on other parties than the 
Socialists: One panelist asked whether ACUM 
can be more than an anti-Dodon front, and 
whether the Democrats will remain coherent or 
will split. 
2020 as an electoral year: 2020 is expected to 
be highly politicized since “everything goes 
around these presidential elections”. Since Do-
don’s key aim is to achieve reelection, most 
speakers assume that the government’s unde-
clared main policy goal is to support reelection 
as a “PR team”, other goals are suspected to be 
subordinated to reelection. This means that 
everything the government promises to the 
public will have a short time horizon to demon-
strate some palpable success to the electorate. 
Deliverables could include small pension rises 
and other social gifts the size of which will de-
termine the degree of populism, and therefore 
also the effect on budget stability. On the other 
hand, it is expected that Dodon also would 
want to “play safe” without shaking up the po-
litical scene too much. Following this logic, one 
speaker argued that early parliamentary elec-
tions in the first half of 2020 appeared rather 
unlikely at this point. The central political risk 
therefore will be what happens after the presi-
dential elections. 
Reforms and the economy: The Chicu govern-
ment is expected to simulate rather than to 
conduct reforms. This is because the Dodon 
presidency cannot go against kleptocratic ele-
ments of the system because they may serve to 
protect his political power, and because they 
are needed as “administrative resources” to 
conduct elections. The country has huge prob-
lems with the absorption of EBRD and other 
donor money. One evidence for the unwilling-
ness to reform is that several bills on anti-mon-
ey-laundering and other justice-sector-related 
initiatives are stuck in parliament and are likely 
to be either withdrawn or considerably amend-
ed. According to one speaker, deoligarchization 
will remain widely popular among the popula-
tion, and might bring considerable advantage if 
used in electoral campaigns. In terms of eco-
nomic growth, the government promised 25 
percent in the next three years. For 2020, the 
projection is only at 3.4, or 3.5 percent. Hence 
the 25 percent look more like a “PR gag” to most 
observers.
Freedom of media: Media are generally under 
pressure in Moldova. Access to information is 
often restricted, especially for investigative 
journalists. The concentration of media is gen-
erally high, which also leads to a monopoliza-
tion of the advertising market. The legislation 
of media regulation features considerable gaps. 
Political interference of politicians into editorial 
policies of media they own or control are com-
mon. Disinformation and fake news are increas-
ingly problematic, especially during electoral 
campaigns. The hope that after the decline of 
the media empire of Vladimir Plahotniuc, media 
pluralism and content would improve did not 
materialize: The Socialist party was quick to es-
tablish and strengthen a media empire of its 
own. One of the reasons lies in the Audiovisual 
Council, a monitoring body whose task is to 
oversee broadcasting media, which is heavily 
dependent on political circumstances. 
While the situation in terms of access to public 
institutions improved and the Action plan of 
the Sandu government was promising, the time 
was too short to implement reforms in the me-
dia sphere. The Action Plan of the Chicu govern-
ment includes two fairly general provisions on 
media and includes proposals to review the 
media legislation framework, and some regula-
tory amendments to the advertising law, or on 
the limitation of offshore funding of media. 
Since 2020 is an election year, a panelist sur-
mised that partisanship and bias will be a 
prominent feature of media reporting. Politi-
cians strive to use journalists as their PR per-
sonnel and would like to see them promote 
their ideology. Therefore, political control over 
the Audiovisual Council and the Competition 
Council responsible for monopolies in advertis-
ing will remain crucial. Moreover, the Socialist 
party is expected to take control over the public 
broadcasters. Legislation such as the private 
data protection law is likely to be used by pub-
lic servants to restrict access to information for 
investigative journalists. Some speakers also 
expect Russian state broadcasters and online 
media to play a crucial role during the elec-
tions. One of the core problems identified by a 
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speaker was that the media community itself 
was only marginally interested in media free-
dom as such, a factor unlikely to change in 
2020. 
International factors: Since in 2020, a new EU 
Commission and Parliament are in place, the 
main questions will be what kind of strategy 
the EU will pursue regarding Moldova, given the 
domestic political turbulence. Among the two 
options are that the EU will reinvigorate its sup-
port for Moldova, or that there will be a Moldo-
va fatigue in the European capitals, the latter 
appears to be more likely. In this respect, the 
new AA agenda and the revised Eastern Part-
nership will be crucial and shape EU-Moldovan 
relations for the next 5 – 10 years. One speaker 
remarked that the metaphor “boxer vs. balleri-
na” mentioned so frequently during the confer-
ence was originally about Russia and the EU, 
and not so much about the Socialists and 
ACUM. Consequently, as Moldova is at the 
crossroads, if Russia continues to invest money 
into media propaganda and cash into political 
projects, and the EU into sessions on democra-
cy and human rights, the outcome in the near 
future might just be the same as with the San-
du government.
4. Deutsch-Bulgarischer Geschichtstag
Zwischen Freiheit und Flucht: 30 Jahre Fall des „Eisernen 
Vorhangs“ und die Gegenwart der deutsch-bulgarischen 
Beziehungen
Veranstalter: Deutsch-Bulgarischer Geschichtsverein „Pamet“ e.V. / Bulgar(i)en in Hannover e.V. / 
Volkshochschule Hannover / Alfred Toepfer Stiftung F.V.S. / Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft e.V. / u.a., 
gefördert im Rahmen des Förderprogramms „30 Jahre friedliche Revolution“ der Bundesstiftung 
Aufarbeitung 
Hannover, 17. November 2019
Bericht von Gudrun Steinacker, Wien
Am 17. November 2019 veranstaltete der 2015 in 
Münster gegründete Deutsch-Bulgarische Ge-
schichtsverein „Pamet“ e.V. unter seinem Vorsit-
zenden Dr. Christoph Lorke den 4. Deutsch-Bul-
garischen Geschichtstag in Hannover in Ko-
operation mit vielen anderen Institutionen – 
unter anderem dem Verein Bulgar(i)en in Han-
nover e.V., vertreten durch Gergana Naumann. 
Beide haben sich vor allem die allseitige Infor-
mation über die Geschichte und das Leben in 
Bulgarien zum Ziel gesetzt, Information über 
die Zeit des autoritären Regimes und Kommu-
nismus, deren Folgen im Land sowie über die 
deutsch-bulgarischen Beziehungen. Die Veran-
staltung in der VHS-Hannover stand unter 
dem Thema „Zwischen Freiheit und Flucht: 
30 Jahre Fall des ‚Eisernen Vorhangs’ und die 
Gegenwart der deutsch-bulgarischen Bezie-
hungen“. Eine Poster-Ausstellung im Vorraum 
des Veranstaltungsraums führte das Thema 
„Der Eiserne Vorhang – Fluchten über Bulga-
rien“ ein.
Dass die Aufarbeitung der kommunistischen 
Vergangenheit in Bulgarien immer noch ein 
heikles Unterfangen ist, erläuterte sehr ein-
dringlich der Journalist Hristo Hristov in seinem 
Vortrag „Umdenken in der Aufarbeitung der Zeit 
des kommunistischen Totalitarismus in Bulgari-
en“. Hristov forscht seit Jahren über diese 
schwierige Phase der bulgarischen Geschichte 
und publiziert darüber in verschiedenen Medi-
en und auf seiner Website. Dies ist in Bulgarien 
auch dreißig Jahre nach dem Mauerfall nicht 
willkommen. Hristov sieht sich und seine Fami-
lie vielen Anfeindungen und sogar konkreten 
Bedrohungen ausgesetzt. Bulgarien stehe im 
Vergleich zu Staaten wie Deutschland, Polen, 
Tschechien, selbst Ungarn und Rumänien mit 
seiner völlig unzureichenden juristischen Auf-
